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EXPLAINING THE “PALLANT V MORGAN EQUITY” 
JULIUS A. W. GROWER* 
 
 “If it can be explained … it can be explained away”.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Open an English trusts law textbook and go to the chapter on constructive trusts. The chances 
are that you will find a section on the “Pallant v Morgan equity”.2 It will detail a specific 
type of constructive trust arising in certain peculiar circumstances. 
The “Pallant v Morgan equity” is given separate treatment because it is thought to be 
unclear how it fits in with any other type of constructive trust. Some have tried to place it 
within certain larger groups,3 but for different reasons each of these attempts is ultimately 
unconvincing. 
The purpose of this paper is to argue that this separate treatment is unjustified. It is 
not that any of the aforementioned explanations are actually right, but simply that no true 
“Pallant v Morgan equity” is anything more than a constructive trust arising in response to an 
agent’s breach of fiduciary duty. Every instance can be accounted for under that quite 
orthodox heading. 
Now this is not the first paper to put forward such an analysis,4 but it will be the first 
to properly argue in favour of it. While they do state that the “Pallant v Morgan equity” is no 
more than a trust arising in response to an agent’s breach of fiduciary duty, the earlier 
contributions never look to explain why. This paper will examine the foundational “Pallant v 
Morgan equity” cases in detail and show that this idea really is not just capable of explaining 
their results, but also accurately reflects the reasoning within them. 
This paper is also the first paper to properly link the presence of fiduciary duties in 
these cases to the operation of the law of agency. Some have asserted that there might be such 
                                                     
* Teaching Fellow, Faculty of Laws, UCL. Thanks are due to Charles Mitchell, Nick McBride, Ian Williams 
and Ying Liew. Any errors are solely my own. 
1 A. Bennett, The History Boys, p. 74 (London, 2004). 
2 See, for example, Section 6 of Chapter 15 of B. McFarlane and C. Mitchell (eds.), Hayton and Mitchell: Text, 
Cases and Materials on the Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies, 14th ed. (London, 2015), and Section 4.5 of 
Chapter 10 of A. Oakley (ed.), Parker and Mellows: The Modern Law of Trusts, 9th ed. (London, 2008).  
3 See, for example, B. McFarlane, Constructive trusts on a receipt of property sub conditione (2004) L.Q.R. 667, 
and Y. Liew, Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1897), in C. Mitchell and P. Mitchell (eds.), Landmark Cases in 
Equity (Oxford, 2012). 
4 See, for example, J. Uguccioni, Buyer Beware [2011] J.B.L. 160, at 163. 
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a connection, but not in a definite5 or comprehensive6 way. By delineating a number of 
different aspects of the law of agency this paper will develop a new and much more coherent 
description of what rules of law really do apply. 
The idea that the “Pallant v Morgan equity” can be rationalised and explained by 
reference to ordinary principles of the law of agency is at odds with most of the modern 
English jurisprudence on the matter. With one exception,7 the cases treat the “Pallant v 
Morgan equity” like the textbooks do: as a special – perhaps even sui generis – type of trust. 
By looking in detail at the recent case of Generator Developments LLP v Lidl (UK) GMBH8 
this paper will show why that view is wrong. As shall be explained, “subject to contract” 
cases like that one raise insurmountable problems for the law’s currently preferred analysis. 
Properly understood however, they also offer important insights as to what the true position 
is. 
 
II. A TYPICAL CASE 
 
From time to time two parties enter into discussions about the purchase of a plot of land 
owned by another. Rather than competing with each other they come to an understanding that 
only one of them will attempt to purchase the land and that if they are successful they will 
grant the other an interest in it.9 
A problem arises when the acquiring party succeeds in buying the land but then 
refuses to hand over any part of it. What can the non-acquiring party do? 
If the parties’ understanding has been sufficiently well-formalised so as to constitute a 
contract, the non-acquiring party could, of course, look to obtain an order for specific 
performance. However, if – for whatever reason – the parties’ arrangement is found not to 
have given rise to a contract, some other remedy will have to be sought. By invoking the 
“Pallant v Morgan equity” the acquiring party may be held to be a trustee of some or all of 
the land in their counter-party’s favour. 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 See, for example, N. Hopkins, The Pallant v Morgan ‘Equity’ [2002] Conv. 35, at 42. 
6 See, for example, M. Yip, The Pallant v Morgan Equity Reconsidered (2013) 33 L.S. 549, at 565 – 567. Yip’s 
analysis is critiqued in Section V, below. 
7 See Section VI, Part A, below. 
8 [2016] EWHC 816 (Ch). 
9 Usually by way of a sale. 
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III. THE CASES 
 
A. Pallant v Morgan Itself 
 
The label “Pallant v Morgan equity” seems to originate from a decision of Megarry J. made 
during the Holiday Inns Inc. v. Broadhead litigation.10 He used the term to describe the type 
of trust held to have arisen in Pallant v Morgan11 itself. 
The claimant in Pallant was the defendant’s neighbour. The two had entered into 
discussions to try to determine the fate of certain plots of land that lay adjacent to their 
properties and which were due to be sold at auction. By the time of the auction, no specific 
agreement over which plots each of them would attempt to purchase had been reached, but, 
just before it began, the two parties’ agents did come to an agreement in respect of one 
particular plot – lot 16 – for which both of them had been given instructions to bid. 
The claimant’s agent – who was authorised to make a bid of up to £2,000 – would not 
in fact make any bid at all and if the defendant’s agent – who was authorised to make a bid of 
up to £3,000 – successfully obtained it, the defendant would convey certain to-be-agreed 
portions of the land, to the claimant, for a price determined according to what was then only a 
partially-agreed pricing scheme. 
Ultimately the defendant’s agent did acquire lot 16 – for £1,000 – but thereafter his 
principal refused to conclude any division agreement. 
Harman J. held that, while the agents’ pre-auction agreement was too uncertain to 
amount to a specifically enforceable contract – something which, from the moment the land 
was acquired by the defendant, would have given the claimant an interest under a Lysaght v 
Edwards constructive trust12 – this did not mean that he had no interest in the property at 
all.13 In fact, he did, but under a different type of trust. 
His Lordship said that while a court could not compel the two parties to agree, it 
could “decree that the property [was] held [on trust] by the defendant for himself and the 
[claimant] jointly [until they agreed upon terms of division]”.14 
The question is: exactly what type of trust was it? 
 
                                                     
10 See Holiday Inns Inc. v. Broadhead, (unreported) 19th December 1969, Ch. D. 
11 [1953] Ch. 43. 
12 (1875-76) L.R. 2 Ch. D. 499, at 505f. 
13 Ibid. at p. 48. 
14 Pallant, at 50. This is uncommon. Where the parties have agreed upon what parts of the property the claimant 
is to get the court will declare that only those specific parts are held on trust. 
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B. The Reasoning in Pallant 
 
It is clear that Harman J.’s conclusion that the defendant held the property on trust for himself 
and the claimant jointly was predicated on his finding that the parties’ agreement, formed by 
their agents just before the start of the auction, had the effect of rendering the defendant an 
agent of the claimant in respect of his own (agent’s) acquisition of the land. As His Lordship 
said: “the proper inference from the facts [was] that the defendant’s agent, when he bid for lot 
16, was bidding for both parties”.15 
This mattered because it meant that “to allow the defendant to retain lot 16 [in] these 
circumstances would be tantamount to [the court] sanctioning a fraud on his part”,16 and this 
belies a breach of fiduciary duty analysis. 
Remember, all agents are fiduciaries.17 They owe their principals duties of loyalty 
which have two core facets: a fiduciary may not put themselves in a position where their 
personal interests conflict with their performance of the task which they have undertaken to 
do, and they must not make an unauthorised profit when doing so.18 The making of an 
unauthorised profit is therefore a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Now, although his language is oblique, it is clear enough that Harman J. thought that 
in refusing to convey any part of the property to the claimant – in retaining all of lot 16 – the 
defendant was making an unauthorised profit out of his position and thereby committing a 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
Historically, in equity, the term “fraud” was broad enough to cover, amongst other 
things, a breach of a fiduciary duty. It indicated that a defendant’s behaviour was 
“unconscientious” in the sense that it was the courts of equity, as courts of conscience, that 
objected to it in some way.19 In light of what was found to have been done, it is therefore 
perfectly understandable that the defendant’s behaviour was given that label. 
As to the remedy, it has always been the case that where a fiduciary makes an 
unauthorised profit by taking advantage of an opportunity which came to him as a result of 
                                                     
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. at p. 48. 
17 New Zealand Netherlands Society “Oranje” Inc. v Kuys [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1126, at 1129f. 
18 Bray v Ford [1896] A.C. 44. 
19 Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] A.C. 932, at 954.  
5 
 
his position, his principal is entitled to a proprietary remedy in the form of a constructive trust 
imposed on that profit.20 
Thus, there was nothing remarkable about the trust which Harman J. held to exist. In 
refusing to hand over any of the land, the defendant exploited an opportunity which his 
agency had presented him with and generated for himself an unauthorised profit: he kept 
those parts of the land which, once there was an agreement, would have been transferred to 
the claimant. This was a breach of the fiduciary duty which he as an agent was necessarily 
subject to, and, consistently with doctrine, a trust was imposed to strip him of that profit. 
 
C. What Lies Beneath 
 
The same can be said of the one case cited in Pallant: Chattock v Muller.21 Chattock 
concerned an agreement that the defendant would purchase a specific plot of land – different 
halves of which he and the claimant each desired to own – and then convey half to the 
claimant in return for a specified sum. Unfortunately, once the land had been obtained, the 
defendant refused to hand anything over. 
Notwithstanding the fact that in his judgment the parties’ agreement constituted a 
binding contract which could be specifically performed,22 Malins V.C. was clear that, absent 
a contract (and a Lysaght v Edwards constructive trust), the claimant would still have had an 
interest in the land. 
He held that “the defendant [had acquired the property] partly on his own account and 
partly as the [claimant’s] agent”,23 and so that in purporting to be the owner of the entire 
estate he had committed “a flagrant breach of duty, which [in equity had] always been 
considered … fraud”.24 In order to remedy this, the defendant would be held “to be a trustee 
… of the [portion of land] which it had been arranged that [the claimant] should have”.25 
This is an agency analysis. As an agent the defendant would have owed the claimant a 
duty of loyalty in respect of his purchase of what was to be their half of the land and so in 
refusing to hand over any part of it once its acquisition was complete he made an 
                                                     
20 See, for example, Bowes v City of Toronto (1858) 11 Moo. P.C. 463 (on a mayor said to be in a directly 
analogous position to an agent), Bagnall v Carlton (1877) 6 Ch. D. 371 (on more orthodox agents), and 
Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 A.C. 46 (on solicitors). 
21 (1878) 8 Ch. D. 177. 
22 Ibid. at pp. 181-182. 
23 Ibid. at p. 181. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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unauthorised profit and committed a breach of that duty or “fraud”. To prevent the making of 
that profit the relevant half of the land would be stripped from the defendant by becoming the 
subject matter of a trust in the claimant’s favour. 
Indeed, even the cases on which Malins V.C. based his own decision were reasoned 
on the basis that an agent had breached their fiduciary duty. In Lees v Nuttall,26 Leach M.R. 
decreed that the defendant was a trustee of the property he had purchased because he had 
made the purchase “as … agent” for the claimant.27 In Heard v Pilley,28 Selwyn L.J. held that 
the defendant, who tried to pass himself off as a contracting party (and therefore an owner) in 
his own right, held the benefit of a contract of sale he had entered into on trust for the 
claimant, due to “the fact of the agency” that existed between them.29 
Thus, in all of the traditional “Pallant v Morgan equity” cases a trust was imposed in 
order to capture the profits of an agent’s breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
D. The Explanation in Banner 
 
The principle underlying these cases was reimagined in Banner Homes Group Plc. v Luff 
Developments Ltd..30 Banner concerned an informal agreement to acquire a certain plot of 
land which was then to be developed and sold. The owner wished to deal with just one 
purchaser so the parties agreed that one of the defendant’s companies would acquire the land 
and that, once their joint venture was fully formalised, the claimant would acquire half the 
shares in that company so as to become, in effect, the joint owner of the land. 
After the defendant’s company acquired the land but before anything was 
authoritatively concluded between the two sides, the defendant changed its mind about a joint 
venture and ended the negotiations. It was left, through its company, as the sole legal owner 
of the land.  
Before the Court of Appeal the claimant argued that it had an interest in the land 
under a “Pallant v Morgan equity”, but, rather than adopting an agency approach, Chadwick 
L.J. introduced an agreement-based analysis into the law.  
                                                     
26 (1829) 1 Russ. & M. 53. 
27 Ibid. at p. 54. 
28 (1868-69) L.R. 4 Ch. App. 548. 
29 Ibid. at p. 551. 
30 [2000] Ch. 372. 
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His Lordship advanced five propositions highlighting what he thought would give rise 
to a “Pallant v Morgan equity”,31 and these can be condensed into three key points: 
 
1) There must be an agreement – which need not be contractually enforceable – between 
two or more parties that one or more (but not all) of them should acquire property. 
 
2) The agreement must provide that the non-acquiring party/parties will, as a result of 
the acquiring party’s/parties’ acquisition of the property, gain an interest in that 
property. 
 
3) The non-acquiring party/parties must (each) either suffer a detriment or confer a 
benefit on the acquiring party/parties, in reliance on that term of the agreement. 
 
Chadwick L.J. said that when those features were present it would be “unconscionable 
to allow the acquiring party [or parties] to retain the property … in a manner inconsistent 
with the arrangement … which enabled [them] to acquire it”,32 and so they must hold it on 
constructive trust for themselves and the non-acquiring party/parties (in the proportions that 
had been agreed, where they could be clearly established). 
This meant that the claimant in Banner did have an interest in the land. The parties 
had formed an agreement that the defendant would acquire – through their company – a 
certain property, and one of the terms of that agreement was that once the joint venture was 
properly formalised the claimant would acquire an interest in it by way of having an interest 
in the company. The claimant acted to its detriment in reliance on this agreement because, 
pursuant to it, it abdicated its opportunity to bid for the land itself. 
 
E. The Problems with Banner 
 
Unfortunately, there are three reasons why Chadwick L.J.’s analysis is problematic. The first 
is that it is simply not a faithful representation of the reasoning in any of the classic “Pallant 
v Morgan equity” cases. This is not to say that it is impossible for English law to 
accommodate such an analysis, but it is to say that this is just not what was understood to be 
going on when a trust arose in those cases. 
                                                     
31 Ibid. at pp. 397-399. 
32 Ibid. at p. 398. 
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The second is that there are some cases – the “subject to contract” cases – in which on 
an agreement-based analysis of the “Pallant v Morgan equity” there should be no trust, but in 
which the conduct of the parties is similar if not otherwise identical to the conduct of the 
parties in regular “Pallant v Morgan equity” cases and in which it might be thought to be a 
good idea to have a trust in the non-acquiring party’s favour. This means that Chadwick 
L.J.’s analysis may not exhaust the field of explanation as to when a trust will be imposed in 
such circumstances, and we face the undesirable prospect of having to innovate and describe 
at least one more rule of law to do so. The Banner analysis may offend the principle of 
Occam’s razor. 
The third reason is that there is a certain lack of conceptual coherence around 
Chadwick L.J.’s analysis. As has been alluded to, its place within the law of constructive 
trusts is unclear and so both its exact requirements and its underlying justifications can be 
doubted. 
 
F. The Implications of Crossco v Jolan 
 
This last point can be seen particularly clearly from the judgments in Crossco No.4 Unlimited 
v Jolan Ltd.,33 the most recent Court of Appeal decision on this issue. 
Because of its focus on an agreement, the argument has been made that Chadwick 
L.J.’s analysis is simply a common intention constructive trust one,34 and this was accepted 
by judges in that case.35 
Crossco concerned a dispute surrounding the demerger of a company into two parts: a 
property side and a trading side. After the division, the property side purported to exercise a 
break clause to terminate a lease of premises held by a business owned by the trading side. 
The trading side tried to stop this, claiming that, due to certain pre-division negotiations they 
shared, the property side held their title on constructive trust so as to give effect to the 
arrangement embodied in the lease, notwithstanding the existence of the break-clause, but the 
court unanimously rejected this contention.36 
                                                     
33 [2011] EWCA Civ 1619. 
34 See, for example, M. Thompson, Constructive Trusts and Non-Binding Agreements [2001] Conv. 265. 
35 Crossco. at [97], [119], and [129], respectively. 
36 Ibid. at paras. [96]-[97], [123], and [132]. 
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Arden L.J., whose reasoning McFarlane L.J. endorsed, invoked the general law on 
common intention constructive trusts which she identified as starting with Gissing v Gissing37 
and as going right up to Stack v Dowden38 and Jones v Kernott.39 
To establish an interest in property under such a trust a claimant must show both that 
there was, prior to that property’s acquisition, “[an] agreement, arrangement or understanding 
… that the property [was] to be shared beneficially [with them]”, and that they had “acted to 
[their] detriment … in reliance on [that] agreement”.40 
Thus, Her Ladyship said that the trading side’s claim could not succeed. There was no 
agreement that the freehold which the property side was to acquire after the demerger was to 
be shared in order to give effect to the terms of the lease.41 
Yet this approach is not in fact completely compatible with what Chadwick L.J. said. 
Clearly it is the case that anyone who can satisfy the first two Banner requirements can also 
prove a common intention that they were to have a beneficial interest in the property, because 
these requirements are identical. 
However, while under the law of common intention constructive trusts a claimant 
must also prove that they have suffered a detriment in reliance on that common intention, 
according to Chadwick L.J. a failure to do this will not necessarily prove fatal to a claim 
founded on a “Pallant v Morgan equity”. One could still establish an interest by showing that 
they conferred a benefit on their counterparty in reliance on the agreement. 
Indeed, this is precisely how Chadwick L.J. said Pallant itself would fit with his 
analysis.42 The claimant’s agent could not have out-bid the defendant’s agent at the auction 
and so even if the parties had not agreed that he would keep out of the bidding before it began 
he would still have failed to acquire an interest in the property. There was no detrimental 
reliance and, if one had been made, a claim asserting an interest under an orthodox common 
intention constructive trust would have failed. 
What mattered, according to Chadwick L.J., was that on top of the bare fact of the 
agreement by agreeing to keep out of the bidding the claimant gave an advantage to the 
defendant who was “able to obtain the property for a lower price than would otherwise have 
been possible”: £1,000, rather than at least £2,001.43 
                                                     
37 [1971] A.C. 886. 
38 [2007] UKHL 17. 
39 [2011] UKSC 53. 
40 Lloyds Bank Plc. v Rosset [1991] 1 A.C. 107, at 132. 
41 Crossco, at [131]. 
42 Banner Homes, at 398-399. 
43 Ibid. at p. 398.  
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Two different things are going on here. 
 
G. Banner’s Place in the Law of Constructive Trusts 
 
So if the law of common intention constructive trusts and Chadwick L.J.’s agreement-based 
approach are not in fact the same thing, what is the relationship between them? 
The answer is that it is still a very close one. Indeed, there seems to be a link between 
the two. 
Consider why the two reliance requirements exist. In Gissing Lord Diplock said that a 
common intention constructive trust would arise “[after] a transaction between [two parties] 
in connection with the acquisition by [one of them] of a legal estate in land whenever [that 
party] has so conducted himself that it would be inequitable to allow him to deny [his 
counter-party] a beneficial interest in [it]”. 
He also said that that the acquiring party would be held to have so conducted himself 
if “he has induced the [non-acquiring party] to act to his own detriment in the reasonable 
belief that by so acting he was acquiring [such] a beneficial interest”.44 
The first of these two remarks aligns exactly with Chadwick L.J.’s explanation of why 
the presence of his three requirements would give rise to a “Pallant v Morgan equity”. Both 
judges say that a constructive trust arises whenever it would be unconscionable for the owner 
of property to deny another’s beneficial interest in it and that the reason why it would be 
unconscionable derives from a repudiation of a pre-acquisition agreement. All they come 
apart on is the issue of what further facts must be shown, besides an agreement, to 
“complete” the unconscionability. 
Thus, rather than establishing a totally different doctrine, Chadwick L.J. might be 
understood as merely extending the range of situations in which a defendant’s denial of a 
claimant’s interest is unconscionable in such a way as to give rise to a common intention 
constructive trust. His Lordship said that the defendant’s receipt of a benefit is an alternative 
to the claimant’s suffering of a detriment and this suggests that he saw it as another way of 
establishing the same type of trust as would arise when (only) a detriment was shown. 
Unfortunately, this is a deeply unattractive idea and its acceptance has caused the 
most unhelpful confluences between these two areas of law. 
 
                                                     
44 Gissing. at p. 905. 
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H. Treating the “Pallant v Morgan Equity” as a Common Intention Constructive Trust 
 
The law of common intention constructive trusts is used in – and usually confined to45 – the 
resolution of disputes about the division of non-marital domestic property because it has been 
shaped by, and reflects a number of subtle factual and policy considerations which apply in 
and only to, that context. 
Thus, because as a matter of fact couples do not usually reduce their understandings 
as to their respective property entitlements to either specifics or even writing – something 
reflective of fact that such actions are to some degree inconsistent with the sort of mutualistic 
relationship they share – the law of common intention constructive trusts has developed 
generous rules as to what evidence is capable of proving that there was an agreement capable 
of being relied upon. Any evidence of discussions, “however imperfectly remembered and 
however imprecise their terms may have been”, can suffice.46 
Similarly, when it comes to establishing detrimental reliance, the evidential threshold 
for doing so is very low. This reflects the fact that the financial lives of cohabiting couples 
are very often disorganised, with much expenditure shared on an ad hoc or arbitrary basis. It 
is not just evidence of direct contributions to the purchase of a property which may suffice, 
but evidence of indirect contributions like a contribution to mortgage payments, too. Indeed, 
even evidence of the sorts of payments which, by being made, enabled the other partner to 
make such contributions by saving them from facing some other form of necessary domestic 
expenditure,47 might be enough. Baroness Hales’ famous paragraph 69 in Stack – which 
listed the factors which could, in the right circumstances, be taken into account – was 
explicitly non-exhaustive.48 
However, none of this is true for the sort of cases in which “Pallant v Morgan equity” 
claims usually arise.  
Commercial parties usually do take legal advice and, even when the words “subject to 
contract” are used, they usually do reduce their agreements to writing. They need to know 
what their rights are at the time that property is acquired and want to be able to make that 
determination by reference to clear facts: their own writing, or, in its absence, the amount of 
money provided towards a property’s acquisition. 
                                                     
45 See Stack, at [3] and [69], and Jones at [24]-[25], respectively. 
46 Rosset, at 132. 
47 Such as paying of utility bills. 
48 Stack, at [70]. 
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Unfortunately, by aligning the “Pallant v Morgan equity” with the common intention 
constructive trust, the rules governing the latter have started to be used to decide cases 
relating to the former, and in being so used they are undermining the respect for certainty 
which should underpin that area of law.  
It is not appropriate for the rights of commercial parties to be determined by the 
retrospective examination of their conduct and words over the entire period that they have 
interacted, yet as Crossco itself demonstrates, this is now precisely what is happening. The 
form and the substance of Arden L.J.’s analysis is like that which we would expect in a non-
married family home case: Her Ladyship first looked for an agreement and then – had she 
found it – would have turned to the suffering of detriment in reliance on that agreement. In 
the absence of writing, commercial parties do not expect their rivals to acquire rights in their 
property unless they have made clear contributions to its acquisition, but now there is the risk 
of exactly that.49 
In contrast, none of this criticism applies to the aforementioned agency analysis. No 
huge uncertainty attaches to modern agency law, or the imposition of fiduciary duties on 
agents under it. This part of our law was developed in the commercial courts and is tailored to 
suit the commercial context. Its constituent rules are clear and long settled, and support the 
promotion of commercial certainty. 
 
I. The Latest Case 
 
Generator Developments50 is a recent case dealing with the question of whether a “Pallant v 
Morgan equity” can arise where two parties’ pre-acquisition dealings were expressly “subject 
to contract”. 
The claimant – Generator – was a property developer and the defendant – Lidl – was a 
discount supermarket chain. They entered into negotiations over a certain plot of land and 
Generator began making offers to buy that land “in conjunction with [their] joint venture 
partners Lidl”.51 However, neither side took steps to formalise their relationship. All of their 
interactions were “subject to contract”. 
                                                     
49 The result in Crossco would not have been different had the Banner analysis itself been applied. The lack of 
an agreement would have been fatal to the application of that doctrine too. 
50 [2016] EWHC 816 (Ch). 
51 Ibid. at para. [47]. 
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After Generator had a bid accepted, Lidl asked if it could be named as the buyer in the 
contract of sale and Generator agreed.52 Lidl bought the land but then changed its mind about 
a joint venture. It denied that Generator had any interest in the property. 
The question for Nicholas Lavender Q.C., sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High 
Court, was whether this was right. Generator claimed that it did have an interest in the land – 
under a “Pallant v Morgan equity” – but this was dismissed. The judge said that despite the 
parties’ use of the words “subject to contract”, a trust might – in theory – still have existed, 
but that on the facts of the case as a whole one had not arisen. 
Now this decision is not, in and of itself, a remarkable one. The case required an 
application of Court of Appeal authority to some not overly-complicated facts and the result 
was correct in principle. Despite this, Lavender Q.C.’s judgement is interesting because it 
exposes the underlying inadequacy of the Banner approach.  
It is telling that the judge struggled to apply Chadwick L.J.’s analysis. His reasoning 
is convoluted and unconvincing. This is because that analysis simply cannot work in a 
“subject to contract” case, despite the obvious judicial inclination for it to (sometimes) do so. 
 
IV. THE MERITS OF SIMPLICTY 
 
There are three good reasons for thinking about a “Pallant v Morgan equity” as a trust arising 
in response to an agent’s breach of fiduciary duty. 
The first is that, unlike the approach set out in Banner, this view is consistent with the 
reasoning in all the old “Pallant v Morgan equity” cases. 
The second is that there is no lack of coherence with this explanation as an 
explanation. Unlike the agreement-focused analysis, the rules of agency law that apply have 
been settled for many years and are of a clear and distinct scope. Nobody thinks that the 
principles of agency law undermine the need for commercial certainty. Indeed, in being so 
clear and precise, they reinforce it. 
The third reason is that, unlike Chadwick L.J.’s approach, it can be used to sensibly 
generate or deny a trust in cases where the parties have used the words “subject to contract” 
during their negotiations.  
 
 
                                                     
52 There were two reasons for this: this is what Lidl normally did, and, as per the parties’ negotiations, it was 
Lidl who were to be providing the funding for the purchase: ibid. at paras. [90]-[91]. 
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A. “Subject to Contact” 
 
A “subject to contract” case looks like the typical case described in above, but for the fact 
that the parties’ pre-acquisition discussions are qualified as “subject to contract”. 
Now recall the first of Chadwick L.J.’s three requirements: that there must be an 
agreement – which need not be contractually enforceable – between two or more parties that 
some (though not all) of them should acquire specific property. 
There is, of course, a middle ground between not having an enforceable contract and 
not having an agreement at all: for example, the agreement in Pallant failed to identify any 
specific portions of land and was therefore too uncertain to constitute a binding contract but 
even so – in Chadwick L.J.’s opinion – it was a good enough agreement on which to ground a 
constructive trust. But it is impossible to see how there can be any such agreement at all in a 
case like Generator Developments where all of the negotiations were undertaken “subject to 
contract”. 
The phrase “subject to contract” means that nothing is agreed so as to impose any 
obligations to act in a certain way until a contract to that effect has actually been formed. As 
Mummery L.J. has said, where it is used the parties proceed “on the basis that no concluded 
[duty-imposing] agreement [has] been reached and … that such an agreement might never be 
reached”.53 
Applying Chadwick L.J.’s analysis, this should mean that wherever the parties have 
expressed their dealings to be “subject to contract” there is no possibility of a “Pallant v 
Morgan equity” arising. One cannot simultaneously both have and not have an agreement 
that one person should acquire a certain piece of property. 
Despite this, in Banner Chadwick L.J. suggested the opposite, and cited Island 
Holdings Ltd. v Birchington Engineering Co Ltd.54 as authority for this proposition.55 
Now granting that in Island Holdings – a “subject to contract” case – a trust was 
rightly held to exist, and granting that it might otherwise be seen as a classic “Pallant v 
Morgan equity” case, it is nonetheless impossible to say that that decision is consistent with 
Chadwick L.J.’s conception of the law. 
The parties in Island Holdings were interested in acquiring different parts of the same 
land. Previously, they had agreed that the defendant would attempt to acquire a 99-year lease, 
                                                     
53 London and Regional Investments Ltd. v TBI Plc. [2002] EWCA Civ 355, at [47]. 
54 (Unreported) 7th July 1981, Ch. D. 
55 Banner Homes, at 398. 
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and that if it was successful the defendant would sell the claimant its interest over that part of 
the land which the claimant wanted to acquire, but this contract fell away when the owner 
then offered to sell the defendant the freehold instead.  
The claimant and the defendant formed a “subject to contract” agreement in respect of 
the freehold with analogous terms to their previous contract, but after the sale was complete 
the defendant refused to hand over any part of it. 
Goulding J. held that from the moment the defendant acquired the land the claimant 
had an interest in it, but that this was not because the parties’ second agreement amounted to 
a contract: their use of the term “subject to contract” meant that no even potentially 
enforceable sales agreement was formed. Instead, a different type of trust had arisen. 
Thus Chadwick L.J.’s position that, on his own analysis, Island Holdings was rightly 
decided is clearly unsustainable. Goulding J.’s findings mean that the first of the three Banner 
requirements was not met in that case. There was no pre-acquisition agreement that the 
defendant should go and acquire the freehold because no such contract had been signed. 
Yet this does not mean that the case was in fact wrongly decided. It is merely that 
Chadwick L.J.’s conception of the law does not work. The result in Island Holdings can be 
coherently explained by adopting an agency-focused analysis.  
Note the findings that although the parties “were once in a position of equal 
opportunity to obtain [an] interest in the site [they] agreed that instead of competing the 
[claimant] should leave it to the defendant alone to exploit the opportunity with a view to the 
subsequent benefit of both [of them]”.56 
Before the parties’ initial (contractual) agreement was formed there was no 
relationship of agency between them, hence why they were legally “equal”, but when they 
formed that contract the defendant not only became duty bound to acquire the property but 
also became the claimant’s agent in respect of their acquisition of one part of it. It was left to 
it to conduct both parties’ business from that point onwards. 
Despite the fact that the first deal came to nothing, Goulding J. observed that the 
parties’ initial agency relationship “was carried forward into [the] new situation” so that 
when it came to the acquisition of the freehold it could be said that “the defendant [only] 
obtained an opportunity to purchase [it] as a direct result of [the original] arrangement”.57 
Thus, in refusing to hand over the relevant part the plot, the defendant may not have 
been in breach of any duty to grant the claimant an interest in the land, but it breached the 
                                                     
56 Island Holdings, at 18-19. 
57 Ibid. 
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non-profit rule which applied to it. As in every case where an agent misappropriates an 
opportunity arising in the course of his work and makes himself a profit, a constructive trust 
was imposed. 
 
B. The Judgment in Generator Developments 
  
In Generator Developments, the Deputy Judge sought to resolve the tension between 
Chadwick L.J.’s agreement-focussed approach and the parties’ use of the term “subject to 
contract” in two equally unconvincing ways. 
The first was to distinguish Mummery L.J.’s observation about the effect of the term 
“subject to contract” on the basis that the case in which he made it was distinguishable from 
the one before him,58 but this point has no weight at all. The strength of an observation like 
Mummery L.J.’s does not depend on the facts of the case in which it is made, and it does not 
need to be part of the ratio of a factually analogous authority to be relevant. The point is that 
all other things being equal, “subject to contract” means “subject to contract”, something 
always true, regardless of the context. 
The second way was to say that that Banner itself was implicitly a “subject to 
contract” case so there could be no objection to the application of the doctrine in such 
circumstances.59 This, however, misses the point being made in this paper that the imposition 
of a trust in such cases does not turn on whether the parties have made an agreement that the 
defendant would acquire the relevant property, enforceable or otherwise, but on a materially 
different set of principles. 
As said above, the Deputy Judge decided the case against the claimant. He reasoned 
that although the parties agreed that Lidl would acquire the property – and so that the first of 
Chadwick L.J.’s three requirements was met – they did not agree that after their acquisition, 
Generator would obtain an interest in it, and so no trust existed.60 
However, while this decision was probably correct in principle, the reasoning 
supporting it was unnecessarily complex and at times incoherent. To come to his conclusion 
the judge took into account no less than nine factors. Some of these were genuinely important 
– indeed, the third should have determined the outcome of the proceedings on its own – but 
others were surely irrelevant. 
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59 Ibid. at para. [192]. 
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Consider the judge’s first reason: that each party “well understood … the meaning 
and effect of the words ‘subject to contract’ which appeared in [all their communications]”.61 
This makes no sense. All other things being equal, no two parties’ use of the term “subject to 
contract” can at once both bar the existence of an agreement that one of them will obtain 
some interest in a piece of land that the other of them is going to acquire, but not bar the 
existence of an agreement that the other one of them should actually acquire that land. Parties 
in these situations only share one course of dealings and, by the time of acquisition, they will 
have come to only one multi-termed resolution. Either the words “subject to contract” 
negative a mutual intention to form any potentially duty-imposing agreement with one 
another or they do not.  
Similarly, the judge’s eighth reason was that “the steps which Generator took to 
protect its position fell short of requesting, let alone obtaining, a written commitment from 
Lidl that Generator would have an interest in the property”.62 Yet if such an agreement was 
embodied in a contract then there would have been no issue here unless that contract was not 
specifically enforceable for some extraneous reason. Why would one look for a “Pallant v 
Morgan equity” at all? 
Remember, the claimant in Pallant himself failed to get – or even ask for – a written 
commitment from the defendant that he would have an interest in the land. Indeed, he and the 
defendant had utterly failed to agree on what parts of the land either of them were to get. Yet 
in Banner, Chadwick L.J. did not suggest that this could negative the fact of a common 
intention shared by the parties that once the property was acquired the claimant should have 
some specific interest in it, in any way. 
 
C. Properly Explaining the Case 
 
In contrast to the above, an agency analysis can be used to coherently explain the existence 
(or non-existence) of a constructive trust in all “subject to contract” cases, including 
Generator Developments. 
It is true that all genuine agency is created through the forming of an agreement63 – 
two parties must share a common intention to be each other’s agent and principal with respect 
                                                     
61 Ibid. at para. [195]. 
62 Ibid. at para. [203]. 
63 The principles which underpin “agency of necessity” are sufficiently different to mean it is best treated as a 
distinct area of law: see, Chapter 18 of C. Mitchell, P. Mitchell, and S. Watterson (eds.), Goff and Jones The 
Law of Unjust Enrichment, 8th ed., (London, 2011). 
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to some activity64 – but such an agreement is different from the sort of agreement – discussed 
in cases like Balfour v Balfour65 – that one party will owe another a potentially enforceable 
positive duty, such as a duty to acquire a specific piece of property. 
A central example of the latter sort of agreement is the agreement that lies at the heart 
of every contract, but it is clear that there is simply no necessary connection between the 
existence of a contract and the existence of a relationship of agency.  
A gratuitous agent is just as much of an agent as a paid one. They owe their principals 
duties of care for the same reason that non-gratuitous ones do, and the standard of care 
expected of them is the same.66 They are all just as much fiduciaries. 
In Norwich and Peterborough Building Society v Steed67 the Court of Appeal made 
clear that an individual who lacks contractual capacity can still validly be another’s agent and 
so can enter their principal into contracts which they could otherwise not form for themselves 
in their own personal capacity. 
Of course, in the absence of a contract an agent owes his principal no positive duty to 
actually do anything, but they still share a legally meaningful relationship and when that 
agent acts within the scope of his undertaking he will be subject to the norms of agency law. 
Crucially, while it is a duty imposing agreement that is both the agreement which 
Chadwick L.J. seems to demand and which is negatived by the use of the words “subject to 
contract”, it is the existence of an agency creating agreement which actually matters. 
Thus, the defendant in Island Holdings had initially agreed not only to become the 
claimant’s agent in respect of the front portion of the land, but he had also agreed to owe him 
a (contractual) duty to sell part of it to him. That duty ceased to exist when the contract for 
the purchase of the lease was set aside, but, without more – as Goulding J. made clear – those 
events could and did not affect the existence of the parties’ relationship of agency.  
Though the parties then took care to prevent the formation of a new agreement which 
might impose any new potentially enforceable positive duties upon either of them, when the 
time came that the defendant refused to hand over the front part of the property they were still 
an agent and that is what counted. 
In contrast, in Generator Developments the parties were scrupulous not just to prevent 
the formation of any agreement that one or the other of them should be under a potentially 
                                                     
64 Garnac Grain Co Inc. v HMF Faure and Fairclough [1968] A.C. 1130, at 1137. 
65 [1919] 2 K.B. 571. 
66 Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1989] 1 W.L.R. 29. 
67 [1993] Ch. 116. 
19 
 
enforceable positive duty to go out and acquire the property,68 but also to prevent Lidl from 
ever becoming an agent. 
As the Deputy Judge observed – though this was merely the third factor he took into 
account – according to the “terms” of their pre-contractual discussions, when it came to the 
purchase the risk was all on Lidl. Generator was not to provide any of the money to fund any 
part of the purchase, and Lidl had no right to ask it for a contribution. If the land proved to be 
worth less than it seemed, Lidl would bear the whole of the loss itself.69  
These features are anathema to the idea that a relationship of agency might have 
existed. If Lidl was acting as an agent in respect of any part of the land it acquired, it would – 
all other things being equal – have been entitled to an indemnity from its principal in respect 
of the cost of it, but nothing it had agreed with Generator was enough to give it such a right. 
When it acquired the land, Lidl was acting solely on its own behalf. 
 
V. THREE TYPES OF AGENT 
 
Citing agency as the foundation upon which all true “Pallant v Morgan equity” cases are 
built does risk giving rise to some confusion. For example, it has been said that if agency 
really is in play, then even though there might be a proprietary remedy when the defendant 
fails to hand over the land, that remedy would be available under a different, non-fiduciary 
mechanism.70 
The logic is that if an acquiring party really is an agent then, as his principal, the non-
acquiring party would have a contractual right against the original owner of the land in 
respect of that part of it which he had agreed with his agent that he was to acquire. After all, 
“a true agent … puts his principal into a contractual relationship with a third party”.71  
Indeed, from the moment the acquiring party entered into the contract with the 
vendor, his principal could therefore be said to have had an interest in the relevant portion of 
land under a constructive trust. There is a long-established extension of the doctrine of 
anticipation famously described in Lysaght v Edwards which applies in favour of principals 
in such situations,72 and so there is no need to resort to fiduciary law to achieve the desired 
result. 
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Unfortunately, this does not accord with the facts of the cases as we find them. In 
Pallant, where a trust was held to exist, there was no pre-acquisition agreement over which 
specific portions of land the claimant was to have (and certainly no common intention that 
they were to share title to the entire plot). It would therefore have been impossible for the 
defendant to have simultaneously entered himself and the claimant into the contract of sale. 
He could not have known what portions, if any, the claimant was contracting, through him, to 
buy. 
Moreover, the type of agent in a true “Pallant v Morgan equity” case is not the same 
as the type of agent that can put his principal into a contractual relationship with a third party. 
There is more than one way to act on another’s behalf recognised by English law. 
For example, in contrast to a contracting agent, a collecting agent is not authorised to 
enter their principal into any contracts with third parties, but they can give good receipt for 
monies due to them (in such a way as to give rise to an equitable liability to account for its 
value).73 
In Nelson v Rye,74 the defendant had agreed to collect a variety of sums due to be 
owed to the claimant and to hand them over on an annual basis, after deducing his 
commission. Entering the claimant into contracts with third parties was in no way within the 
scope of his authority, but the defendant was still said to be a real agent and therefore a 
fiduciary.75 
Of course, the agent in a “Pallant v Morgan equity” case is not a collecting agent, 
either. He is a “property acquiring agent”. He has neither the capacity to enter his principal 
into contracts with third parties, nor the capacity to give good receipt for monies owed to 
them. Instead he is authorised to acquire new property in his own personal capacity, albeit on 
his principal’s behalf. 
In a simple case, to acquire such property a property acquiring agent enters himself 
into a contract and when he acquires a title under that contract, he is expected to transfer it in 
specie to his principal. He accounts for the property itself and not just for its value.76 He is 
entitled to be indemnified for his expenditure, and he is, as a type of agent, a fiduciary.77 
Where the agent and their principal share a contract the agent will, of course, be duty-
bound to make said transfer, but where they do not, they will not be. Nonetheless, if the agent 
                                                     
73 Barnett v Creggy [2014] EWHC 3080 (Ch), at [66]. 
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75 Paragon Finance, at 416. 
76 Ibid. 
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retains the property this will constitute a breach of fiduciary duty on their part and will allow 
their principal to bring an equitable proprietary claim in respect it. 
In a genuine “Pallant v Morgan equity” case, the principal is only usually interested 
in a predetermined portion of the land. The agent himself is personally interested in the rest 
of it. As said in Chattock, this means that when acquiring the land the agent acts in a dual 
capacity: “partly on his own account and partly as [an] agent”.78 His agency relates only to 
the part of the land which his principal is meant ultimately to acquire, and his position as 
regards that part of the land is as stated above. 
This is why the non-acquiring party in a “Pallant v Morgan equity” case is never said 
to have any contractual rights against the vendor in respect of any or all of the land his agent 
acquires. It is also why, despite being the acquiring party’s principal, there is no chance that 
the non-acquiring party would ever be held liable to the vendor for any or all of the purchase 
price. The rules which would give both of them such a right – the laws which say that when 
an agent (disclosed or not) is acting within the scope of his authority and enters into a 
contract with a third party, the parties to that contract are the third party and their principal79 
– are not in play. They are peculiar only to the case of a contracting agent and the agent in 
“Pallant v Morgan equity” case is not such an agent. 
This is why the Deputy Judge in Generator Developments was ultimately right to 
think that the fact that Generator was not to fund any part of Lidl’s purchase was important in 
determining whether or not a constructive trust existed. Though he did not say so, it matters 
because it shows that whatever agreement they had come to was not one which created a 
relationship of acquisitive agency. 
Thus, there is no reason why an agency analysis of the “Pallant v Morgan equity” 
cannot stand as a coherent alternative to that propagated by Chadwick L.J. in Banner. Not 
only are the fiduciary rules in play totally orthodox, but so too are the agency rules which 
underpin their application. 
 
VI. THE TRUTH IS OUT THERE 
 
In showing that a “Pallant v Morgan equity” really is nothing more than a constructive trust 
arising in response to an agent’s breach of fiduciary duty this paper should not be thought of 
as bringing forth any particularly great legal revelation. After all, as it has shown, this 
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analysis is right there waiting to be drawn out from the cases. What it is trying to do is 
persuade people to recognise and accept this fact.  
 Moreover, as noted above, there have been other attempts to substantiate such an 
explanation, but perhaps due to their brevity, these have not gained any particular traction. 
 
A. Efforts at Home 
 
Consider the “one notable exception” referred to in Section I above: the judgment of Etherton 
L.J. in Crossco.  
Like Arden and McFarlane L.JJ., Etherton L.J. held that the Banner analysis of the 
“Pallant v Morgan equity” formed part of the law of common intention constructive trusts, 
but he also went on to say that the suggestion of a connection between that analysis and what 
was really going on in a true “Pallant v Morgan equity” case was “untenable”.80 He said that 
all such cases could actually be explained “by the existence and breach of [a] fiduciary 
duty”.81 The courts were “depriving the defendant of [an] advantage obtained in breach of 
[fiduciary duty]”.82  
Unfortunately, this is essentially all he said on this issue. He provided no specific 
explanation or analysis of what was said in Pallant or in any of the other old cases, bar 
stating the fact that, as in Chattock, the defendant acted as the claimant’s agent when they 
acquired the land.83 He left it to the reader to look back and see whether or not this was really 
true.84 
Now one might have thought that, despite its brevity, such a learned plea for revision 
might have been enough to herald a reversion in approach but subsequent courts have refused 
to follow it. In Generator Developments, the Deputy Judge dismissed Etherton L.J.’s view 
almost out of hand.85 So too did the Deputy Judge in Credit & Mercantile Plc. v Kaymuu 
Ltd..86 
                                                     
80 Crossco, at [87]. 
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for example, N. Hopkins, The Pallant v Morgan ‘Equity’ – Again, [2012] Conv. 327, and M. Lower, The 
Pallant v Morgan Equity, [2011] Conv. 379. 
85 Generator Developments, at [33]. 
86 [2014] EWHC 1746 (Ch), at [130] and [155]. 
23 
 
Similarly, it should be telling that the country’s leading agency law textbook claims 
both Pallant and Chattock as relevant authorities, but this fact has never been noted in the 
judgments. Thus, in the 20th Edition of Bowstead and Reynolds,87 both cases are cited in a 
chapter on the “Duties of Agents Towards Their Principals” specifically within a section 
about agents acquiring for themselves, “in breach of duty”, an unauthorised benefit from a 
third party.88 Having said that, each case is only mentioned once and even then only in the 
footnotes. 
 
B. Hints from Abroad 
 
Neither New Zealand nor Australia recognise the existence of a particular type of 
constructive trust like the “Pallant v Morgan equity”: its existence is a peculiarly English 
problem. Thus, the way those two jurisdictions treat cases with essentially the same fact 
pattern should be instructive.  
 In the New Zealand case of Chirnside v Fay,89 two property developers came together 
to develop a site in Dunedin. Their relationship was never formalised, but it was agreed that 
the defendant – Chirnside – was to acquire the land while the claimant – Fay – was to work to 
find a future buyer for it. After the land was acquired the defendant repudiated the 
arrangement. 
Now Chirnside is unusual because the claimant sought an account of profits rather 
than a declaration of an interest under a constructive trust, but the Supreme Court was clear 
that all other things being equal such an alternative claim could have been made.90 
There was disagreement as to why the defendant became the claimant’s fiduciary – 
Elias C.J. and Keith J. said that the relationship between joint venturers was an inherently 
fiduciary one,91 whereas Tipping J., Blanchard J., and Gault J., all said that it was not92 – but 
all agreed that he was one,93 and that in behaving as he did, the defendant “was in breach” of 
his duty. “He diverted to his own account the entire joint venture, in breach of the no-conflict 
limb”.94 
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None of the judges sought to rely on any English “Pallant v Morgan equity” cases, 
and yet each reached the same conclusion that they would have had they followed them 
precisely. The concept did not need to be invoked for the right result to be reached. 
Similarly, when it comes to Australian law, Finn has described the leading English 
authorities – which have occasionally been referred to but which have never been applied – 
as “superfluous”. To dispose adequately of such cases, he says, it “needs no separate rule”. 
“[They] would be dealt with [as involving] a breach of fiduciary duty”.95 
Admittedly, neither jurisdiction goes so far as saying that the defendant’s status as a 
fiduciary is grounded on agency rather than on some other legally significant relationship, but 
this paper’s thesis is directed only at the English “Pallant v Morgan equity” cases, which are 
the only cases which consider the trusts arising within them to be a special type of 
constructive trust, and in which it always is.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
So, now we know that the view that no true “Pallant v Morgan equity” is anything more than 
a constructive trust arising in response to an agent’s breach of fiduciary duty is indeed the 
correct one. It explains not just the outcomes of all the foundational “Pallant v Morgan 
equity” cases, but – crucially – the reasoning contained within them, too.  
 We also now know for sure that the reason why fiduciary duties come into play at all 
is because of a routine operation of the law of agency. The defendant in a typical “Pallant v 
Morgan equity” case becomes – by way of an agreement – the claimant’s (gratuitous) 
property acquiring agent. When he acquires the land, he does so partly on his own behalf and 
partly for his principal. 
 In isolation, Generator Developments might well appear to be an insignificant 
decision but “subject to contract” cases like it provide an important insight into what is really 
going on. They show that the modern view – that the “Pallant v Morgan equity” is, at a 
minimum, an agreement and reliance based constructive trust – is unsustainable and that an 
agency analysis is capable of making sense of what occurs when a trust is found to have 
come into existence despite the parties’ use of those portentous words. 
Far from reflecting any sort of unusual principle, a “Pallant v Morgan equity” is a 
trust which arises exactly when one would expect it to. The principles which underlie them 
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form first part of the law of agency and then fiduciary law, both long-established and well-
settled doctrines. There is therefore nothing particularly special or peculiar about them. In 
every other case where an agent profitably exploits opportunities presented to them by their 
role the law employs no special labels. The profit is simply said to be held on constructive 
trust. Why should it be different here? 
 
